Introduction
There are two rather compelling reasons for posing the question as to whether a unified social science is a realisable possibility. First, and most obviously, the query itself is intellectually intriguing -can we cogently conceive of such a 'science' 1 and, if so, what would be involved in laying out its foundational precepts? Second, and less obviously, though of equal importance, there is a politico-intellectual reason. The standards of rigour and sustained reasoning being so variable across the social sciences, one might hope that any attempt to open up the debate surrounding the issues of unification may have the effect of driving them up. Unacceptable standards are currently widespread and maintained, first, because some disciplines are effectively insulated in the universities behind departmental, disciplinary boundaries and, second, because those working to higher standards, whilst being entirely aware of this situation, tend merely to shrug their shoulders with an air of resignation. This seems to me to be morally unacceptable, so one of my objectives in writing this paper is to stimulate a cross-disciplinary debate which may in turn foster the spread of better practice. I trust this may be a realisable possibility even if unification proves to be but a mirage.
We should start be asking which of the current array of disciplines might be candidates for A good way to start is by clarifying the intellectual role which the word 'social' might be allowed perform in our endeavours. A simple diagram which I have found useful in this respect is depicted in Fig I. 2 It points to four types of explanatory question, each of which at least one of the established social sciences addresses and all of which when taken together provide a focus for unification. I shall use the word 'social' to indicate that we are usually concerned to explain a (macro) state of the (social) system (i.e. at the top right hand corner of the diagram). That is to say, it is not, in general, an ambition of the social sciences to explain per se individual states/actions (i.e. the bottom right hand corner of Fig I) . Such explanations are only sought in so far as they are permitted to contribute to explanations of macro states. 3 Examples could be an (equilibrium) price in competitive markets (from economics) or levels of group, cohesion or social capital (from sociology). 
Conditions of 2 Individual individual (micro) actions (micro) actions
The arrows in the diagram can stand for a number of types of connection or explanation (causal, aggregation, definitional or even emergence in the case of arrow 3) but for the moment it will expedite the argument to think solely in terms of causal explanations.
Consequently, the diagram invites us to speculate about the interplay of four types of causal mechanism. In general, we may conceive of dynamical systems (which may or may not be tending to a steady state) at two different levels of abstraction (see footnote 3), the macro and the micro, and pose the question as to their interrelationship. Sociologists will recognise type 4 explanations as essentially Durkheimian; here a prior state of the (social) system causes (ceteris paribus) a later state of the system. Thus, following Durkheim, exogenously established societal norms cause (ceteris paribus) societal rates of suicide. Durkheim argued that such (causal) mechanisms should be conceived as operating sui generis, at the societal level and, as a consequence, appropriately analysed independently of mechanisms 1, 2 and 3. 4 An economic example of a type 4 mechanism might be the level of competition in a market causing the reduction in (equilibrium) price. Economists are, however, much less prone than sociologists to analyse level 4 relationships as sui generis. Nevertheless, a debate continues about whether, and if so how, macro-economics should be securely derived from micro foundations. I will return to the nature of this quest but we may note in passing that it suggests an encounter with the other three types of mechanism depicted in Fig I, though, in fact, type 1 explanations are rarely sought by economists. 5 In general, however, for those social scientists who do not care to adopt a strict Durkheimian perspective there is an obvious way in which they will be inclined to see type 4 explanations as, in some manner, derivative of the conjunction of types 1, 2 and 3. So, for example, to take a non-Durkheimian interpretation of suicide rates (top right hand corner of Fig I) Sociologists frequently promote their discipline as one which involves the study of social interaction and exchange. Accordingly, level 2 mechanisms then need to capture the idea whereby 'the conditions of action' (bottom left hand corner of Fig I) describe how others impact the actions of each focal individual. 10 Instructively, economists are also concerned with economic exchange between (exogenously endowed 11 ) individuals, but abstract away from detailed descriptions of such exchanges in their most vaunted achievement -general equilibrium theory. 12 They do so to avoid the need to chart the details of non-equilibrium exchanges. How and why they do this is an issue I shall return to, but again it is tied up with the adoption of an appropriate simplification in the search for, in this case, a highly stylised equilibrium macro state.
As soon as the idea of (social) interaction is given a central role in our endeavours it is essential that a basic distinction is drawn between models which are parametric and those which are strategic. If actors can be modelled as responsive to their 'conditions of action', which may, amongst other things, include other actors' actions which may be treated as fixed and are not themselves responsive to the focal actor, then the conditions are parametric. The canonical model here is the aforementioned general equilibrium theory where at equilibrium fixed prices determine purchasing actions. If, however, we need to understand how actors reason about the way other actors will act in response to their own actions (and vice versa) then the situation becomes strategic. This distinction is central to modern economic theory but rarely explicitly acknowledged by sociologists. 13 It should be, though, and I believe an understanding of how, why and when we should adopt one approach rather than the other may provide one useful ingredient in approaching a unified social science. Indeed, matters go even deeper; sometimes we may wish to model individuals in terms of what is in the natural sciences termed an 'independent individual approximation'. That is to say in order to approximate a highly complex micro dynamics one discards the idea of interaction altogether replacing it by some general (or average) situated environment. Let me take an example from my own research into generalised reciprocity and social capital. A collection of N individuals may be described in terms of the dynamics of 'who helps whom' (a complex network of dyadic strategic interactions 14 ) . So, individual helping actions are 'caused' by specific others' helping actions. In practice, however, we may (particularly when N is large) discard the strategic details of the micro-dynamics and adopt the standpoint of "the characteristic individual" in a 'mean helping environment'. It should be borne in mind nevertheless that the theoretical generation of such a parametric environment, which provides a picture of the mean effects of other actors on each focal actor in turn, although having the appearance of an exogenous parametric force impacting each individual is in fact endogenously generated. 15 Theoretical sociologists have often appeared theoretically lax in not appropriately marking this distinction and, in particular, have shown little sensitivity to how the nature of theories may change as N dwindles.
Economists also handle situations of interdependent strategic complexity, inherent in economic exchanges, in a rather similar manner in their general equilibrium theory. Arrow (1983) writes of general equilibrium as follows: "the key points in the definition are the parametric role of the prices for each individual and the identity of price for all individuals".
Again these prices are generated endogenously and they appear (at equilibrium) rather like exogenous parametric forces. General equilibrium, however, provides no picture of how equilibrium prices are arrived at. The theoretical structure abstracts away from theoretical exchange (i.e. interactions) between individuals. 16 So, in both sociology and economics it does appear that, at least when N is large, there may be some common ground in reducing the complexity of strategic interactions to more tractable parametric models. We need to look at this possibility more closely in the context of unification.
What apparently most divides the social sciences -particularly economics and sociology -is however, for the purposes of this essay, be brought into contact since it is useful to conceive of norm-learning (i.e. normative socialisation) in terms of an interactive dynamic. 27 I shall later propose that if it is the case that optimal choice lies at the centre of microeconomics then equally interactive socialisation plays a similar role in sociology. If so the question then arises as to how they may be brought together within a unified perspective.
Returning to the rational choice perspective. Many sociologists opine that people just do not, in fact, make decisions (carry out actions) which follow some or all of the various precepts of rational choice. And of course they are often correct, it would take very little effort to spot human activities where it would prove difficult to bring them under the auspices of the perspective. But this is to miss the point. We should judge the claims of the rational choice models both as a rigorous and parsimonious conception of the individual which is often (not necessarily always) empirically more successful in predicting social states (top right hand corner of Fig I) than others. It should be noted that this is, from the sociologist's standpoint, an empirical claim not an a priori theoretical or normative one. It is nevertheless perplexing to encounter sociologists claiming on a priori grounds that rational choice can never (rarely)
provide an adequate framework. Surely sociologists, given the relative success of economics, must find overwhelmingly secure grounds for rejecting rational choice, at least as a starting point. 28 Furthermore, since what we might term the strict rational choice model (broadly speaking maximising expected utility) may be subjected to a wide range of systematic adjustments whilst staying within the broad ambit of the theory (e.g. embracing bounded rationality, relative utility, time inconsistent preferences, other regarding sentiments, subjective optimisation, various cognitive biases 29 ) this should further give sociologists some pause in their eagerness to find another starting point. If one is prepared to permit this rather broad interpretation of the rational choice model then it is imperative to ask what amongst the 'strict' precepts one must ultimately hang on to whilst still remaining within the jurisdiction of the model. I think it is the idea of optimisation, for it is this idea that enables the analyst to make predictions about which actions will be 'chosen' whatever are the preferences or partial understanding or cognitive biases which encumber individuals. If sociologists can find a leading idea, which can rival, shall we call it, subjective optimisation, then an intelligible debate might become possible.
The inclusiveness inherent in my catholic interpretation of rational choice might, whilst allaying the fears of some sociologists and psychologists, nevertheless offend may economists. Rightly, the latter often opine; if we are willing to assume in a post hoc manner any sort of preferences or distortions in reasoning then our theories become well nigh irrefutable. Furthermore, they continue, in what sense is the behaviour/action studied still deemed to be rational?
I adopt what is I suspect a rather heterodox and pragmatic view of these matters. Where the boundary should be drawn between what is and is not rational is, I think, of no great moment.
The important point is that a very simple model of actions -expected utility theoryprovides not only a first explanatory resort but also a rigorous framework in which the modifications I mentioned above can be progressively introduced. Could we imagine prospect theory is the absence of expected utility theory? Ultimately a point arrives when it may no longer be helpful to think in terms of modifications of the latter -but only ultimately (see for instance a wonderful review paper by Rabin, 1998) . Certainly, the research agenda, which embraces the incorporation of psychological insights into rational choice theory, demonstrates a rigour, which, by contrast, makes much micro-sociology look rather insubstantial. The concern about post hoc irrefutability must of course always provide cause for concern. But equally worrying are economists' attempts to furnish often highly ingenious standard rational choice interpretations of events when an empirically available alternative interpretation, which requires some adjustment of the standard theory, is at hand. I think the answer here, whilst it won't be palatable to many economists, is for us to learn something from sociology and to draw more readily upon empirically derived testimony of actors (Manski 1995, chapter 5) . For instance, the repeatedly observed willingness of players to punish in one-shot ultimatum games can, if one wishes, be derived from strict rational choice precepts and an assumption whence the players think they will in fact be involved in repeated encounters (Gale et al 1995) . However, a little testimony would, no doubt, reveal a sense of justice and retribution to be involved.
One apparent appeal in adopting a catholic interpretation of rational choice is that it provides space for dynamic models in which biases and incomplete information may be progressively eliminated in the course of individual or social learning. This brings us close to sociology once again for it can imply learning through interaction or socialisation. We should nonetheless be cautious about the universal directionality of 'learning'. Kahneman and Tversky (1982) amongst others point to 'errors of application' which show that individuals who are in possession of appropriate rational principles may not apply them in repeated particular cases. Furthermore, even experts may be overconfident in unpredictable situations.
But how does rational choice theory relate to the sociologists' emphasis upon interactively learned 'normative action'? Empirically one can scarcely doubt that individuals often appear to follow rules or the normative expectations of others rather than to consciously deliberate along the lines required by the precepts of rational choice. The most influential sociological model of 'normative behaviour' -role theory -usually takes the normative expectations which one role holder has of another as exogenous. Thus, social life is largely a matter of learning (socialisation) and then abiding by the appropriate rules. 30 Again the picture is often proffered by sociologists as a theoretical insight -but, surely, it is rather an empirical one.
Do people sometimes, often, always so behave (i.e. act)? The answer, I suspect, is perhaps frequently but certainly sometimes. Economists and those sociologists who chose to adopt a rational choice perspective would, however, when faced with empirical evidence of normative actions, seek to endogenise either or both the generation and diffusion of the norms. These objectives would these days also usually be approached from an evolutionary rational choice (often game theory) standpoint. Clearly an interesting question is whether or not norm following is, indeed, optimal and can be constructed as an equilibrium (Elster 1989 (Rabin 1998) . Furthermore, norms may evolve in a path dependent manner from prior normatively constrained situations , Elster 1989 . Be this as it may, there is ample room here for open and constructive debate between economists and sociologists but this will only be achieved if theoretical sociologists begin to acquaint themselves with the technical rigour of evolutionary dynamics and game theory (see below). Although treating norms as optimally evolved and diffused brings into relief the appropriateness of assumptions about self-regarding rational choice, it can also centre our attention upon the mechanisms of social interaction and socialisation whereby norms are learned and transmitted in populations. It seems to me it is here that the ideas which may underpin a unified social science may be sought -by promoting an understanding of when and how socialisation takes place in the context of social interaction. Indeed it may well prove useful to sway somewhat in the direction of sociology by interpreting rational choice (or even bounded rationality) as particular sorts of norms (rational norms!). It could be that interactive socialisation then plays a part in establishing meta-norms (normative expectations) indicating situations where either 'rationality' or some other sort of normative compliance is what is expected of one . In an evolutionary frame work rational choice may still, however, triumph as its precepts may show how the 'situations' have evolved. So let us now turn in the direction of social interaction.
Before moving on, however, I should like to interpose a personal conjecture. Although I have in this section of the paper argued for an intellectual accommodation between the rational choice and interactive socialised models of the individual, my own view is that we will, in addition, have to find some room for personkind as responsive to ideas of justice.
Although this troublesome word can mean many things in different institutional contexts, I
am continually impressed by how both altruistic and (partially) malign intentions can arise in the context of the ubiquitous feelings about justice or fairness, which arise in social interactions (particularly reciprocity). I doubt we can understand much of the social world without taking this into account (and not just as enlightened self-interest in repeated interactions).
Fortunately there is some indication that at least some economists may partially agree (Rabin 1993 , Fehr and Gachter 2000 , though see Gale, Binmore and Samuelson 1995 .
Social Interaction
Most sociologists believe that an understanding of the causes and consequences of social interaction lies at the heart of their discipline. Though, if we are to follow my earlier injunction, such understanding is not to be pursued per se but only in so far as some macro state can, in turn, be explained. The approach we may adopt in modelling social interactions is significantly governed by three factors: firstly, the number of interactants and interactions (i.e. at level 2 in Fig I) ; secondly, whether the interactions are conceived as parametric or strategic; and thirdly, whether the consequences are of a significant (i.e. motivating) magnitude to those involved.
Whereas a model of the individual, which puts optimal choices at the centre of things, is the guiding micro principle for most economists, the parallel principle for sociologists is one, The challenge underlying the search for a unified social science is one of finding an intellectual accommodation between the relaxed rational choice and interactive models. One apparent way of universally achieving this needs, however, to be discarded at the outset.
Economists might naturally see interactive socialisation merely as a recipe for endogenising those preferences, expectations and opportunities which are the ingredients (skills) of a standard rational choice interpretation. 32 This is, of course, a possible and attractive option open to exploration as sometimes true. But I think a rather more elaborate picture is needed if sociologists are to be brought on board. A second apparently attractive route also needs, from a sociologist's standpoint, to be approached rather cautiously. A hard line rational choice theorist would wish to endogenise the structure of interaction, itself, in terms of rational choice precepts (i.e. the structure would be chosen under the auspices of RCT);
namely as the result of optimal search. Most sociologists will resist this possibility, either as a universal or even initial analytical prescription. Their insight is that many actions (or their constituent beliefs, affects and values) are derived from interactions with others whom are not chosen in any conscious sense (for the purpose at hand). For this reason the structure of interaction (i.e. with whom one interacts) is usually postulated as exogenous (Coleman 1990 ).
Clearly, this cannot be a universal analytical prescription either. It is, of course, feasible also that we derive from our interactions guidance as when to and not to choose rationally and, thus, when and when not to derive things from others. Furthermore, this derivation may also sometimes be the rational thing to do, particularly if deliberation is costly and others are deemed better informed (Conlisk 1980 I should like to contrast three models of interaction as follows:
i. The endogenous structure model.
ii. The endogenous interaction exogenous structure model.
iii. The exogenous interaction exogenous structure model. The endogenous structure model (type i) is closest to the classical rational choice perspective.
Individuals exogenously endowed/placed with 'conditions of action' (e.g. preferences, beliefs and opportunities) generate a structure of interaction (with other individuals) in search of 'information' which may in turn modify their conditions and, thus, their prior actions. This structure may then, in turn, subsequently be the source of either exogenous or endogenous interaction as described next. This is the approach with which sociologists appear not to be very happy as they are inclined to see most situations as ones where there is a received 'structural history'. In practice, I suspect, we shall have to begin to think in terms of the coevolution of structures and the actions of individuals. Meanwhile, we may look to Jackson and Wolinsky (1998) for the most promising approach from a sociologist's standpoint, to endogenising structure. Starting from a rational choice perspective these authors search for equilibrium structures when links are costly to establish and maintain.
Sociologists are inclined to make their opening gambit with a model, which makes the structure of interaction exogenous (often constructed for 'other reasons').
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Then the simplest model (type ii) is one where the focal actors/agents merely derive (perhaps in an iterative manner) their actions (or their observable outcomes) from those actors to whom they are (exogenously) connected (Friedkin 1990 , Doreian 1981 ). This leads (at the micro level 2
in Fig I) to patterns of endogenous interaction within the framework of an exogenous structure. Sociologists, however, often in addition postulate (type ii) patterns of exogenous interaction i.e. 'contextual effects'.
As Manski (1995 chapter 7) has observed there appears to be a marked tendency for sociologists to theorise in terms of endogenous interaction but then to empirically test contextual models (e.g. neighbourhood effects). Since both mechanisms are concurrently possible, it is important to clearly separate them both theoretically and empirically and also to differentiate them from any 'correlation effects'.
Combining Rational Choice and Interaction
If we may conceive of a unified social science wherein a relaxed conception of individual rationality is carefully combined with dynamic notions of socialisation through interaction, then what is the theoretical way forward? Sociologists have developed a number of dynamic models where the interaction is by and large parametric, usually depending upon simple density dependence contact or copying 36 (Coleman 1984) . These more or less complex deterministic and stochastic diffusion models have, however, not entered main stream social theory to any appreciable extent (though see Fararo 1989) . Furthermore, over the years a number of empirical studies have made use of contextual and endogenous interaction models where the conditional expected value of the appropriate variable is used to proxy the details of micro interactions (Hauser 1970 , Crane 1991 , Jenks and Mayer 1989 , Mayer 1991 . But again, even though to ignore such effects, if they exist, will bias the estimated impact of any exogenous variables, empirical sociologists still almost invariably assume micro unit independence.
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Few systematic attempts have been made, at the theoretical level, to explicitly model interactions. This, however, is the direction we must go and return to the roots of the discipline.
In doing so it is probable that the analysis of strategic rather than parametric interactions will gain in prominence . This being the case, it is in the direction of some adaptation of evolutionary game theory that we may look for a unifying theoretical inspiration. One attraction of doing so from the sociologists' standpoint is that evolutionary game theory has no need of strong rationality assumptions. Rather dynamic interactive processes are usually deemed to myopically procure rationality over a period of time. Thus, equilibrium is not achieved as a consequence of rational actions but actors acquire rationality if and when an equilibrium is achieved. With myopic adjustment as actors do not take account of how their own actions affect others and behave as though the world is stationary even though it is not. But this is a useful approximation. Furthermore, the equilibrium can be disturbed in a predictable manner by the entry of new actions/strategies (i.e. equilibrium innovations disturbing as noted above often urged by sociologists). These conceptions of equilibrium and rationality, thus, seem rather compatible with many traditional sociological concerns. Evolutionary models work well when N is large (or alternatively, the number of interactions is large), the strategic situations modelled are not over complicated and the ratio of payoff returns to learning and switching costs (i.e. changing strategy) are of sufficient magnitude to motivate actors. Much of the early work on evolutionary models has assumed patterns of random pairwise interactions between actors. 38 Sociologists will wish, however, to complicate this picture in several respects. Firstly, as we saw earlier, they will often start with an exogenous structure of interaction (i.e. a picture of who interacts with whom). In large social systems this structure will characteristically comprise of a loosely linked aggregate of more densely interacting local systems. We have little knowledge of how to model and sample from such systems (Marsden 1990 ) though it is significant that it is not sociologists but economists who have made a start. 39 Furthermore, sociologists will also want to model the structure itself as evolving, in the sense that current interactions will enhance (weaken) the probability of future use (i.e. learning by using a relationship). So, we will need to model the dynamics of the structure of interaction itself. We will, thus, begin to think in terms of the co-evolution of the structure of interaction and the actions (strategies) of the actors.
Secondly, sociologists will allow for a (possibly evolving) 'structure of observability' whereby actors are able to observe and react to the interaction of others (i.e. a picture of who observes whom interacting). Thirdly, as a consequence, actors will acquire reputations (for acting in certain ways) which will change through time. Thus, to put it succinctly, much more local detail in the patterns of interaction and reference will be needed than occurs in most current evolutionary models for them to prove convincing to sociologists. It is, of course, in light of my earlier remarks concerning simple models of interaction important to find some happy medium. It will not prove feasible for instance to impose the detailed models sometimes used in small group research when N grows (e.g. the full structural models as in Friedkin 1990) . Some progress has been made by adopting 'neighbourhood effects' into the evolutionary dynamics of conventions derivative of simple co-ordination games (Ellison 1993) . Multiple conventions (i.e. differing equilibria) are possible which may even be nonexclusive (Goyal and Janssen 1997, Sugden 1995) . Although the diffusion models developed by sociologists have, by and large, been parametric in inspiration it may prove instructive to picture the spread of 'traits' (e.g. beliefs, values etc.) as essentially strategic (in the sense of finding a co-ordination equilibrium). Indeed, even the evolution of meaning (a central sociological concern) may be constructively handled in this manner (Skyrms 1996 chapter 5)
The leading idea in evolutionary dynamics is that actors tend to switch according to some dynamics specification, from less successful to more successful strategies (actions). The reference group for relative success can vary with either or both of the structures of interaction or observability (which is often taken to be the population). Three measures of success traditionally enter the dynamic specification. First, the current success of a particular strategy when interacting with other strategies; second, some measure of the success of other strategies (e.g. their mean success or the most successful); third, the proportion (i.e. density) of the actors adopting the particular strategy. Density dependent dynamics will capture the historic success of a particular strategy whereas relative success dynamics concentrate upon the current situation. It is useful to conceive of a continuum of dynamic models ranging from, at one end, dynamics, which are purely density dependent to the other end where, rather, they depend entirely upon success.
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The standard Taylor-Jonkers (replicator) dynamics can then be proven to lie at the centre point of this continuum, weighting, density and success equally (Bender and Swistak 1996) .
Pure density dependent dynamics (usually proposed by sociologists) are most apposite where social interactions are what I above termed as parametric. The individual propensity to adopt a particular action (strategy) depends upon the (perhaps local) density of contacts (exogenous structure) with others. The question then arises as to how complicated the picture of (parametric) social interaction should be. Simple deterministic and stochastic models of diffusion (usually logistic in form with an upper equilibrium at a carrying capacity) have dominated the field (Coleman 1969) . The model of interaction underlying this dynamic formulation is one of simple pairwise interactions between those with a 'trait' and those without. In the standard model the rate of propagation of the trait is proportional to the product of the members with and without the trait. This is appropriate where the (exogenous) structure is either complete (i.e. each pair of interactants is equally likely) or incomplete but where the interaction patterns are, nevertheless, random. Surely some unified theoretical and research programme is possible here, which will explore the steady state implications of different dynamic specifications across the density to success continuum matched, where appropriate with different types of strategic interactions. I suspect there are some rather deep theorems to be discovered in this respect signalling the sensitivity of steady state equilibria to different dynamic models and the shape of the functions linking transition probabilities with density and relative success.
It is already known that with stochastic dynamics and patterns of local interactions pathindependent equilibria are possible (Blume 1993 , Ellison 1993 within the compass of a reasonable time period.
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Sociologists have always, in a rather ill-specified way, been inquisitive about when and where history dependent and independent predictions hold. The framework within which to think about these matters is now taking shape.
Sociologists will want to push things a little further by introducing status (or reputation) and threshold effects into their dynamic picture. It is perhaps useful to contrast the sociologists and economists treatment of status/reputation. By and large economists have not tampered
with standard assumptions about arguments in utility functions when conceiving of reputation effects. Rather, the acquisition of a reputation is almost invariably conceived as instrumental to the achievement of standard utilities (usually in a repeated game context i.e. repeated interaction). Thus, it is in the rational self-regard of actors to seek reputations. This is clearly the most parsimonious way for economists to incorporate 'status seeking' into their theories (Nowak and Sigmund 1998) .
Sociologists, on the other hand, in so far as they have addressed the issues systematically, have often offered to picture status as an independent objective.
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If so, dynamic specifications would not only contain terms for relative success and density but also status at some point on the density success continuum. Whilst it seems initially sensible to follow the economists instrumental viewpoint, it may be that independent status seeking does, at some point, play a role in dynamics. The significance of this possibility can be appreciated by considering PD type strategic interactions. If the benefit (utility) derived from the status of co-operating is greater than the cost of the co-operation then the PD is transformed into a coordination game. So the nature of strategic interaction can be fundamentally transformed.
Contrast, for instance, social capital interactions where: (a) helping others leads to a reputation for helping (i.e. status) which, in turn, increases the likelihood of being helped at a later date (i.e. generalised reciprocity) and (b) where helping confers status which boosts one's utility. The issue is that depending upon the assumptions one makes the dynamics will vary dramatically. Furthermore, it does appear that independent status may well acquire the characteristics of a relative utility measure. This being the case, the status of others may exert a negative externality upon oneself (i.e. status is derived from the difference between my reputation and yours and vice versa). Here dynamics may lead to a status race without any increase in mean satisfaction (utility). For example, happiness per capita does not seem to increase with wealth per capita above a certain threshold. This may be an example of emergent status effects (see next section).
Finally, sociologists seem to believe that threshold effects are endemic in dynamic processes.
So, for instance in a given population there will be a distribution of the probability of changing strategy (action) depending upon the (often local) density of the strategy in the population. Some will move easily, others with more difficulty. This may equally apply to relative success.
The way of reasoning embodied in the preceding paragraphs depends upon a large N and/or number of interactions. An important question is how we might proceed if these numbers are not high . I shall, however, leave these matters to another occasion.
A Note on the Macro Level (Level 4) -Emergence?
As noted earlier sociologists often appear to seek formulations of causal connections, which operate exclusively at the Macro level (level 4 in Fig. I ). This approach to matters I have firstly, an assertion that macro concepts (states) cannot be derived from micro concepts;
second that the macro causal connection itself cannot be reduced to causal links 1, 2 and 3 in Fig I. Although the concept of emergence has acquired a number of meanings, I should like to distinguish between strong and weak versions. By strong emergence I shall mean the doctrine that in principle macro states cannot be reduced to (or deduced from) micro states; nor can macro causal connections. Weak emergence, on the other hand, may be used to describe situations where in practice, given our present intellectual understanding, it proves impossible to find an acceptable micro reduction.
Related to strong emergence are two further ideas. First, the absence of supervenience; that is to say the map from macro states to micro may be many to one (the many to one map the other way round is not controversial). Second, the idea that macro states cannot be obtained by simply averaging or aggregating over micro states particularly in respect of inference 3 in Such would amount to the idea that there is some form of 'macro' causality which is logically independent of micro actions. I can attach no meaning to such an idea; of course, we may not be able to formulate the causal structure implied by 1, 2 and 3 ( Fig. I ), but this is a matter of weak, not strong, emergence. (Abell 1988 ) is that any causality in fact runs from the top left hand corner to the bottom right hand corner (as in Fig II) . 44 That is to say causality operating independently of the structure of interaction (context of individual action in Fig I) . Such causality can itself invite two interpretations. First, non-emergent whence mechanism 1(a) is merely the transitive causal closure of the mechanisms working through 1 and 2. Note here, also, that mechanism 4 is now the transitive closure of 1(a) and 3 45 . Second, a causal picture whereby 1(a) operates independently of 1 and 2 either because the latter do not operate or do operate alongside mechanism 1(a). Certain diffusion models proposed by sociologists, for instance, take these various forms where the rate of propagation can variably depend upon pairwise interactions and the absolute number of non-converted individuals. The endogenous and exogenous interaction models mentioned above which proxy interactions by conditional expectations varying across reference 'groups' are nonemergent variants of this theme. They are, indeed, independent individual approximations which are designed to suppress the minor details of interactions in terms of a mean field effect. They, in practice, treat each micro individual as reacting independently of others by an (intra-group) identical force (i.e. the appropriate conditional expectation). We are now finally in a position to define a working model of weak emergence. Relation 1(a) is weakly emergent if this exists no practical way deriving it from an independent individual approximation. This 1(a) may be (weakly) emergent but 4 is the transitive closure of 1(a) and 3 and can only be derivatively emergent if 1(a) happens to be so.
Returning to the theme of co-evolution; in general both social forces (1a) and interactive mechanisms (2) may determine actions and, thus, social actions. But the mix can vary over time. In the extreme we have a 'community' where interactive mechanisms solely determine the actions and at the other extreme where social forces (i.e. weak emergences) play this role. 46 Note that when the latter is the case the endogenous and contextual interaction model reduces to the impact of correlation effects only.
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Thinking in these terms should, I trust, enable economists and sociologists to unite with a common perspective.
15 Sociologists refer to the use of mean effects of this sort as cross-level or structural effects. In the context of Fig I complex (strategic) interactions at level 2 are being approximated by a mean in the appropriate population. One could conceive the mean of a macro system level concept at the top left corner. 16 Tatonnement is, of course, the word used, under the auspices of the Walrasian auctioneer, to describe the groping towards equilibrium (but this is not based upon pairwise exchanges or interactions). Interestingly, models of dyadic economic exchange of the Edgeworth Sort do converge upon competitive equilibrium prices as N increases. Once again we may note that the style of theory which is appropriate depends upon N. The convergence of these two ways of looking at markets is a conspicuous sign of the maturity and rigour of economics. Such convergences are common in the natural sciences but totally absent from sociology (I suspect because of the low standards of intellectual rigour in theoretical sociology). 17 I shall use the term equilibrium to mean a steady state in macro dynamics (Fig I) . 18 In this respect some summary characteristics of a micro distribution are used to describe the macro state ( Fig  I) . Sometimes but seldomly the distribution is conceived as a stoctiastic process (e.g. a finite Markav chain) which may of course have a dynamic equilibrium. Because social theories are rarely rigorous formulated whether or not the structural distribution is at a dynamic equilibrium is rarely thought through. Some social theorists use the term equilibrium but unfortunately rarely in a coherent fashion. 19 This is an aspect of supervenience which would dictate that the macro is supervenient on the micro if and only if the macro does not distinguish any state that cannot be distinguished at the micro level. It is generally held that macroscopic properties do not supervene upon the microscopic in the physical sciences. The situation in the social sciences is, however, more debatable, see . If supervenience is absent then the map between micro and macro dynamics is many to many. 20 In the extreme of course only of the 'history' of the system can be described. 21 That is to a Durkheimian or structuralist approach. It is sometimes suggested this approach involves emergent concepts (and equilibria) in the sense that such concepts have no corresponding concepts at the micro-level. 22 This usually leads to a model, which maximises expected utility. Prospect theory is, of course, a development (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) 23 The word structuralist has been given many other imprecise meanings by sociologists. 24 If we interpret structuralism as an exclusive attention to level 4 then we would need to find a concept of 'social causality' not derivable from micro causality (see below). 25 I shall deal with innovation below but this can raise my earlier point about the fleeting nature of a particular equilibrium. 26 Role theory where people as role holders always follow the normative expectations of other role incumbents is the most detailed version of this approach. Role theory has though had only a marginal impact upon empirical sociology and has been accused of promoting an 'over socialised view of individuals'. 27 I shall try to justify the assertion below. 28 To do so would be to contravene the proposition that people often do the best for themselves in a situation, as they understand it. 29 I am thinking here of, for example, prospect theory. The various biases supported by this theory may, of course, be interpreted as (sometimes) invalidating expected utility theory. However, I think it more sensible to see them as extending and developing the theory. 30 Defying the norms gives the starting point for an understanding of 'deviant behaviour'. 31 They often do this in the context of an abstract evolutionary test of the optimality of the norms. Furthermore, economists will deploy much ingenuity in order to preserve the assumption of rational choice-particularly selfinterest. So, for instance, altruistic norms will characteristically be derived from provident self-interest. It is here that sociologists will often demure, also some economists (Fehr and Gachter 2000) . 32 Note that sociologists speak of beliefs, values and affects whereas economists use the term's expectations, preferences and opportunities. They can, I think, be translated. I shall use the economists' terms (see Elster 1989) as economic theory as so much better developed and it is, thus, sociologists' responsibility to adapt. 33 As N dwindles the complex models may become more appropriate. 34 Such an analytical starting point seems quite consistent with the precepts of institutionalism in economics. 35 See Manski (1995) . Correlation effects arise when individuals are grouped and the grouping variable(s) correlates with the endogenous variable. Identification problems arise in separating the impact of endogenous and exogenous interactions and correlation effects. Lagged models help to sort out these problems but this directs attention to an understanding of the dynamics of interaction effects. This could be an active area of research in any attempt to generate a unified social science. 36 Coleman introduced diffusion models where estimates of the rate constants can be derived from he (exogenous) structure if interaction. 37 We need to control for exogenous and endogenous interaction effects in order to ascertain the independent effect of any exogenous variables. This observation tends to suggest that the routine use of regression based models (without allowances for interactions) is not appropriate. 38 Simple diffusion models also have this characteristic. 39 I refer here to stochastic stability with local interaction e.g. Blume (1993 Blume ( , 1995 and Ellison (1993 Ellison ( , 1995 . 40 Models will characteristically contain terms for both the frequency of interaction and revision of strategies (actions). 41 One may wish to think in terms of a larger continuum ranging from historical density dependence (i.e. lagged measures of density) to at the other end forward-looking success measures (e.g. rational expectations). The continuum mentioned in the text is, in effect, embedded in this larger continuum. 42 Stochastic dynamics without local interactions have a low probability of settling upon the (risk dominant) equilibrium in co-ordination problems in a reasonable period of time. Thus, in the face of multiple equilibria (e.g. co-ordination) the equilibria arrived at will be path-dependent. 43 Status may also be best conceived as relative. 44 Note this formulation in effect revises arrow 1 in Fig I. The conditions under which such aggregations can be effected are well understood. 45 In the light of the discussion in the paper, the bottom left hand corner of Fig 
